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If Bruce Mann had written Neighbors and Strangers as he describes it
in his reply,' he might have been right in stating that I mischaracterized his
work. But instead his reply presents a version of legal change revised to
write out the central aspects of his theory that I critiqued in my Article.
2 I
used the term "modernization theory" as a simple way of referring to the
underlying thrust of Neighbors and Strangers that, in the early eighteenth
century, the legal system in colonial Connecticut transformed in response to
an expanding economy and other changing social conditions by becoming
more formal and predictable and by providing more uniform decisions,
thereby creating conditions for a more commercial and market-oriented
society.' In one passage, for example, Mann states:
An expanding economy requires that individual transactions be
governed by generally applicable rules. Because of the sheer
number of such transactions and the distances they may involve,
they have to be conducted in a routine fashion. Their form and the
legal rules that direct them must be uniform and calculable.
Rational economic exchange requires the assurance that like cases
will be treated alike. To provide that assurance, general rules
override the individuality of particular cases and force them into a
common mold. Formal requirements that limit litigation to the
instruments themselves and restrict appeals homogenize the
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3. I might have simply adopted the language of Cornelia Dayton's book review in which she
describes Neighbors and Strangers as "a sustained argument for the emergence by 1750 of a legal
system geared to serve the interests of a commercial (or capitalist) political economy." Cornelia
Dayton, Law and Disputing in Commercializing Early America, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1538, 1546
(1989) (book review).
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underlying transactions and give them a uniform, predictable legal
character.4
This passage and others like it5 portray law and economy as functioning
in a tight, mutually reinforcing, and evolving relationship in a context of
economic expansion. In the passages of my Article that Mann characterizes
as reducing his argument to the claim that "judges, acting instrumentally to
promote economic growth, engineered the legal changes," 6 my intention
was to show that Mann focuses on local sources of law--on the "law"
emerging endogenously out of relationships between individuals within
local communities-through resolution of disputes in the courts by judges.
My Article presents a starkly different view of eighteenth-century law
by emphasizing the ways in which currency policies enacted by colonial
assemblies, mercantilist policies adopted by Parliament and the Board of
Trade in England, as well as domestic and international economic
conditions influenced the forms in which people transacted and the volume
of litigation. Far from the picture Mann presents of increasing calculability
accompanying economic expansion, my study shows an economy rocketing
between currency gluts and shortages compelling resort to commodity
money and barter, with litigation volume careening in response.
More particularly, my focus is the importance of the colonial
governments' issuance of the first paper monies to an understanding of debt
litigation during the first half of the eighteenth century in New England. In
my account, the issuance of paper money, in a society largely operating
without coins or other cash, had the potential to lead to greater
commercialization, specialization, and less household subsistence, but these
ambitions were not realized because of unstable government currency
policies. Each colony's annual determination of the paper currency in
circulation reflected a struggle within colonial assemblies, which faced
pressure from part of the public-often debtors-to issue paper money in
greater volume, and conflicting pressure from English and New England
merchants who desired a stable currency of high value to satisfy English
import debts. The tensions between the elected representative assemblies
4. BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY
CONNECTICUT 36 (1987).
5. E.g., id. at 31 ("[T]he agrarian economy of Connecticut grew enough to change the
contours of commercial activity."); id. at 37 (" The formal rationality of written instruments made
them better suited than book accounts to credit transactions in the expanding economy of
eighteenth-century Connecticut."); id. at 41 ("The expansion of the economy in the eighteenth
century did not mean that all commercial dealings had become faceless and impersonal....
[P]opulation growth, migration, and economic development drew people beyond town and county
boundaries and changed the way they did business with one another."); id. at 44 (" [Flormally
rational credit instruments facilitated the establishment of routine credit transactions in an
expanding economy.").
6. Mann, supra note 1, at 1871.
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and the English-representatives of a foreign sovereign promoting a
mercantilist agenda-led to policies that created disastrous uncertainty.
New England experienced periods of extreme depreciation and periods of
currency scarcity in the years 1726 to 1730, 1733 to 1734, and 1738 to
1741, when colonial citizens were forced to revert to barter and commodity
money exchange.
I present data revealing that the periods of greatest currency instability
coincide with periods of exponentially increasing litigation. Moreover,
contemporary pamphlets concerning Massachusetts's currency policies
show that colonial citizens were frustrated by the swamping of the courts
with debt-related litigation during periods of currency instability, that some
complained bitterly about excessive court fees, and that serious questions
were raised about judges' dogged enforcement of the common-law
principle of nominalism-allowing debtors to satisfy their debts with
payment in nominal, not real, values of the debts. Thomas Hutchinson (the
future governor), for example, wrote in 1736: "[T]he Government is the
Guarantee that all just & legal Contracts shall be perform'd; but with us
they are daily broken, & necessarily will be so, whilst our Money continues
in its present fluctuating Circumstances."
7
Mann views our depictions of law in New England in the eighteenth
century as compatible (actually, he asserts that I present a new strand of his
interpretation). I disagree. Mann refers to economic advance in connection
with legal development so many times in Neighbors and Strangers that it is
impossible to characterize my Article-uniformly finding that New
England colonial growth rates were low and litigation rates volatile-as
consistent with his analysis.' Mann concedes the low rate of economic
growth in his reply, but there remains a fundamental conflict between our
accounts. The conflict at base involves the question of whether debt
litigation ending in default or confession of judgment represented colonial
7. A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF THE HONOURABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
ON THE
PRESENT STATE OF THE BILLS OF CREDIT (Boston, 1736), reprinted in 3 COLONIAL CURRENCY
REPRINTS, 1682-1751, at 150, 160-61 (Andrew McFarland Davis ed., 1910). 1 found strong ties
among currency policies, debt litigation, and the seeds of revolution in Massachusetts. During a
period of severe currency scarcity (and high levels of debt litigation), there emerged a widespread
popular movement to establish a private bank backed by land. Parliament suppressed the 
Land
Bank by applying the Bubble Act to the colonies in 1740. John Adams later claimed that the "act
to destroy the Land Bank scheme raised a greater ferment in this province than the Stamp Act
did." JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGLUS; OR, A HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE WITH AMERICA, FROM 
ITS
ORIGIN, IN 1754, TO THE PRESENT TIME (1774), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 3,
49 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851) (emphasis
added).
8. A recent article by Peter C. Mancall and Thomas Weiss proposes that the rate of colonial
economic growth was most likely close to zero, see Peter C. Mancall & Thomas Weiss, Was
Economic Growth Likely in Colonial British North America?, 59 J. ECON. HIST. 17 (1999), a
lower estimate than those proposed by the economic historians cited in my Article, Priest, supra
note 2, at 1340 n.126.
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creditors using litigation as a mechanism for securing credit (Mann's
characterization, on which he bases his theory of legal modernization) or,
rather, whether those judgments primarily represented real defaults deriving
from deep economic instability (my characterization).
A central empirical finding presented in Neighbors and Strangers is
that when colonial citizens began relying with greater frequency on formal,
written credit instruments, litigation in the vast majority of cases ended in
either confession of judgment or default. Mann notes the absence of
contestation of this debt litigation (particularly in comparison to litigation
on book accounts, where debtors contested debts at higher rates) and
concludes that the certainty of formal credit instruments led to a system
whereby "credit had become something extended in single transactions in
return for formal admissions of liability." 9 In Mann's account, colonial
litigation served as a form of securing credit, much like filing a financing
statement under the Uniform Commercial Code. Mann infers from this
interpretation that more confessions of liability and more default judgments,
generally speaking, suggest greater commercialization, particularly when
economic advance is assumed. Thus Mann states:
Commercial expansion brought with it-indeed, rode the crest of-
a rising tide of indebtedness.... The sharp increase in uncontested
debt actions in the 1730s, in particular the sudden tendency of
debtors to confess judgment against themselves to facilitate
collection by their creditors should they fail to repay, underscored
not only the massive increase in indebtedness but also the
acceptance of indebtedness as a necessary cost of doing business."
In my account, confessions of judgment and defaults were not a
rationalized means of security recordation, but represented creditors using
litigation to collect debts after real defaults during fluctuating economic
conditions. Contemporary sources indicate that the defaults were of two
sorts. During periods of currency depreciation, debtors failed to repay their
debts as a delaying tactic to benefit from declining currency values, forcing
their creditors to sue." In contrast, during periods of monetary scarcity,
9. MANN, supra note 4, at 40.
10. Id. at 62.
11. In a 1743 pamphlet, one writer claimed:
This [legal tender] Law ... habituat[ed] Debtors to suffer themselves to be sued for
indisputable Debts, and to appeal from Judgments obtain'd against 'em upon their own
Defaults to the Superior Court merely for Delay; ... this Sort of Actions multiply'd in
Proportion, to the great Hurt and Scandal of the Country; insomuch that the Number of
such Suits within the Province was increas'd ... Between the Years 1730 and 1742, to
near double what it was before.
AN ENQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF THE BILLS OF CREDIT OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS-
BAY IN NEW-ENGLAND IN A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN IN BOSTON TO A MERCHANT IN
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often coinciding with economic recessions, litigation followed widespread
default.
2
Mann's interpretation of litigation, that "debtors conceded liability
before payment for their creditors' convenience," 
13 assumes a key empirical
fact: that litigation occurred close in time to the execution of the debt
agreement. The ambition of debt recordation is to establish a legal priority
to a debtor's assets. Delay of any period reduces the value of the debt by
affording an opportunity for other creditors to establish claims prior or
equivalent to the previously extended debt. Mann recognizes the
importance of this empirical fact. Indeed, in his reply, Mann urges an
empirical study of this question to resolve whether his interpretation or
mine is right, 4
Unfortunately, Mann appears to have missed my Note in The Yale Law
Journal, where I present the results of exactly the empirical study he
proposes.' Using the records of the Plymouth County Courts, I examined
over 3500 cases ending in a default judgment in the period 1724 to 1750 to
determine the length of time between the date the parties entered debt
agreements and the date creditors filed suit to collect. Mann's interpretation
implies that litigation to enforce debts was brought at the time the credit
agreements were entered into or shortly thereafter. My interpretation-that
confessed judgments and defaults in the first half of the eighteenth century
primarily represented real defaults-implies an interval between debt
execution and litigation beyond the term of the debt. The customary terms
of credit extended to local retailers in the period ranged from six to twelve
months, though sometimes less.
1 6
I found that the median interval between debt execution and litigation
for all debt litigation ending in default between 1724 and 1750 was 531.5
days (17.5 months).' 7 Only 14.5% of all debt cases resulting in default were
litigated within six months of the execution of the debt agreement." I
LONDON (n.p. 1743), reprinted in 4 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, 1682-175 1, supra note 7, at
149, 162-63 (1911) (citation omitted).
12. As I discuss in two separate places in my Article, both Mann and Dayton note that in
1740, the year of the highest volume of debt litigation in Connecticut, agricultural prices dropped,
which brought debtors to courts in high numbers. Priest, supra note 2, at 1308-09 n.l 1, 1385-86.
Indeed, Mann refers to the 1740s as a "decade of economic distress" that resulted in abnormally
high litigation volumes. MANN, supra note 4, at 62-66. Mann's account of these changes,
however, reflects only a variation from the general emphasis on an increase in litigation volume
paralleling an expanding economy.
13. MANN, supra note 4, at 45.
14. Mann, supra note 1, at 1879.
15. Claire Priest, Note, Colonial Courts and Secured Credit: Early American Commercial
Litigation and Shays' Rebellion, 108 YALE L.J. 2413 (1999).
16. See id. at 2431 & n.70.
17. See id. at 2436 tbl.3.
18. Id.
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therefore concluded that the vast majority of default judgments-at least
85.5%-represented litigation after real defaults.
Mann describes litigation ending in "confessions of judgment" as a
more certain example of debt-recording than litigation ending in default. 9
In Plymouth County from 1724 to 1750, however, the median interval
between the date of the agreement and the lawsuit in cases ending in
confession of judgment was over four years (1549.5 days).20 In
Massachusetts, therefore, confession of judgment did not represent a
concession of liability before the creditor planned to collect the debt. It was
likely a way to reduce court fees during litigation after a real default.2
Notwithstanding our deep differences, I am very grateful to Mann for
suggesting ways in which the analysis might be improved. Perhaps I should
have given greater recognition to Mann's discussion of paper currency's
positive impact on commercialization, although in overlooking the details,
he failed to see the true relevance of currency policies to his theory of legal
change. Mann's suggestion that the data be adjusted for population growth
is complicated. Aggregate population is not the appropriate denominator;
the population of debtors or the number of loans might be better, though
these metrics, too, are endogenously affected by economic fluctuations.
Finally, I could have been clearer that Mann does not focus solely on
litigation volume. Changes in litigation over time are so central to his
account, however, that my treatment can hardly be regarded as unfair.
Indeed, he again emphasizes his "confession of liability" theory-which,
unfortunately, the Massachusetts data do not support-as a further
argument in his reply.22
Unfortunately, Professor Mann has read my Article too personally.
There are many significant contributions in his highly detailed book, and it
19. See Mann, supra note 1, at 1878 n.46 ("Confessions of judgment clearly constitute an
admission of liability.").
20. Priest, supra note 15, at 2438 tbl.4.
21. My Note proposes that high court fees prevented creditors from using the courts for
recordation purposes. I analyzed court fees in relation to the value of underlying debts. In a 1740
court session, for example, I found that, for the lowest quartile of debts (debts in the smallest
amounts), court fees represented 79% of the value of the underlying debt. Id. at 2426 tbl.1. On
average, court fees represented 32.6% of the underlying debt. Id. I compared fees to estimates for
wages at the time and found that court fees represented on average eight days of work for a
farmer, 5.8 days of work for a skilled craftsman, and almost two weeks of work for a seaman. Id
at 2427 tbl.2. I concluded that litigation purely to record debts was an undesirable strategy;
indeed, burdening debtors with court fees may have decreased creditors' chances of repayment.
The Massachusetts government did not provide for an inexpensive means of recording debts until
after Shays' Rebellion. See An Act for Rendering Processes in Law Less Expensive, ch. 43, 1786-
1787 Mass. Acts 105; Priest, supra note 15, at 2447.
22. Mann, supra note 1, at 1878-79; see also CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE
THE BAR: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN CONNECTICUT, 1639-1789, at 90, 102 (1995) ("In
essence, the burgeoning volume of uncontested debt cases represented the capitalization of the
New England economy.").
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contains many important insights that my Article does not address."
Regrettably, however, like much other legal history, Mann's work only
touches upon, but does not take seriously, the problems of money supply in
the colonies, although they were intimately related to litigation in the period
he describes. As a consequence, his account of legal development remains
misdirected. A fuller history of the nuanced relations among law, economy,
and society must necessarily place currency policies more centrally in the
account.
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23. Mann accuses me of unfairly criticizing Dayton. Mann, supra note 1, at 1872 n.17. I
thought it so obvious that my Article does not address the core contributions of Dayton's Women
Before the Bar-a classic account of the role of women in the colonial courts-that I did not think
it necessary to distinguish the focus of my Article at great length. I cannot imagine any legal
scholar believing that I have "tarred" Dayton.
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